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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5911
This study tries to remedy the current lack of tax 
compliance research analyzing tax morale in 10 Eastern 
European countries that joined the European Union 
in 2004 or 2007. By exploring tax morale differences 
between 1999 and 2008, it shows that tax morale has 
decreased in 7 out of 10 Eastern European countries. 
This lack of sustainability may support the incentive 
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based conditionality hypothesis that the European Union 
only has a limited ability to influence tax morale over 
time. The author observes that events and processes at 
the country level are crucial to understanding tax morale. 
Factors such as perceived government quality and trust 
in the justice system and the government are positively 
correlated with tax morale in 2008.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
More than 15 years ago, Baldwin (1995) wrote: “The gains from enlarging the EU eastward 
are potentially enormous. Indeed, it is easy to forget what is at stake. Until recently, millions 
of  men  and  billions  of  dollars  of  equipment  stood  poised  for  combat  in  Europe. 
Communism‟s demise defused this situation by destroying the existing political and economic 
structures in the East. However, the outcome of this „political creative destruction‟ is still 
uncertain. If all goes right, rapid Eastern growth would lock in democratic and pro-market 
reforms, fostering peace and stability throughout the continent. In particular, expanding the 
market to another 100 million consumers would be a bonanza for West European exporters. 
However, if all  goes wrong, widespread  economic failure in  the East  could  have serious 
consequences for all of Europe. Even if this did not provoke a return to authoritarianism, 
serious political or economic turmoil in the East could lead to mass migrations and harm the 
confidence of investors throughout Europe. An intermediate outcome is the most likely, but 
these two extreme scenarios serve to illustrate an important fact. Europe is at a turning point 
in its history.” (p. 475) In the past two decades since this statement was made, Eastern Europe 
has experienced substantial changes. Eight countries from that region joined the European 
Union (EU) on May 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia,  and  Slovenia)  and  two  joined  the    EU  in  2007  (Bulgaria  and  Romania).  A 
democratization  and  marketization  process  (Haughton,  2007)  has  taken  place  in  these 
countries, and such an enlargement was the most significant since the European Community 
was created in 1957. It was an important historical event for the EU, termed as the “big bang” 
enlargement (Noutcheva & Bechev, 2008), and required the building of a suitable tax system 
(Bernardi, Chandler & Gandullia 2005). However, it is unclear “when, why and how the EU 
shaped, directed and occasionally determined change in the CEE
1” (Haughton 2007, p. 233). 
                                                 
1 Central Eastern European countries   3 
Exploring the effect of the EU on these countries‟ policies and governance is  challenging due 
to  causality  or  internal  validity  problems:  “Based  on  a  counterfactual  understanding  of 
causality… the  statement that EU causes a particular outcome implies that if the EU were to 
absent that particular outcome would not occur. (…) However, establishing the causal effect 
of the EU is far from easy even if one takes full account of alternative explanations. One 
problem is that factors and mechanisms we associate with European integration often generate 
similar  empirically  observable  implications  rather  than  rival  implications  for  domestic 
developments. (…) Moreover, these developments might exhibit similar temporal patterns. 
European  integration,  globalisation,  neo-liberal  ideas,  new  public  management,  new 
information and communication technologies or the individualisation of society emerged in 
the second half of the last century and intensified in recent decades” (Haverland 2006, pp. 
135, 137).   
The CEE countries wanted to replicate the political system and economic success of 
Western  Europe  or  the  US,  independent  of  the  desire  to  prepare  for  EU  membership 
(Haughton 2007). Our study will not be able to solve these problems as our research will be 
confined  to  the  10  EU  member  states  mentioned  beforehand  who  experienced  the  EU 
integration. One may attempt to disentangle potential factors through a better understanding 
of the EU‟s transformative power by studying, e.g., the countries and their development over 
time. Here we focus only on one aspect, namely citizens‟ social norms regarding compliance 
with tax responsibilities. In line with the literature, we refer to this as tax morale (Torgler 
2007a).  We  will  see  that  institutional  and  governance  conditions  are  key  factors  in 
understanding tax morale. Tax administration reforms also play a key role in promoting tax 
morale.  
However, it is interesting to  check whether the EU makes  a difference. Haughton 
(2007), for example, points out that the EU seemed to be extremely powerful, acting as a 
magnet in the first post-communist years, and as a gatekeeper in the path to the European   4 
Union.  Noutcheva  &  Bechev  (2008)  stress:  “EU‟s  offer  is  important  because  it  creates 
additional incentives to build a pluralistic democracy and pursue liberal economic reforms at 
home, and thus empowers political and social groups benefiting from Europeanization. On the 
other hand, the path of non-reform has advantages of its own for rent-seeking elites unwilling 
to  undermine  the  sources  of  their  domestic  power  by  introducing  accountability  and 
transparency in policy making” (p. 115). Martinez-Vazquez & McNab (2000) also argue that, 
in countries negotiating their accession to the European Union, the intention to accede acted 
as a catalyst for rapid tax reform shaped along western lines. On the road to integration with 
the EU, changes in the tax system were carried out to bring processes in line with developed 
countries  (Owsiak  2007).  Schimmelfenning  &  Sedelmeier  (2004,  pp.  671-676)  developed 
different models of EU external governance. The incentive model suggests that a state adopts 
EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs. The effectiveness 
of  rule  transfer  then  increases  if  rules  are  set  as  conditions  for  rewards  and  the  more 
determinate they are. The effectiveness of rule transfer increases with the size and speed of 
the  rewards.  Moreover,  the  likelihood  of  rule  adoption  increases  with  the  credibility  of 
conditional threats and promises but decreases with the number of veto players incurring net 
adoption costs from compliance. The social learning model on the other hand suggests that a 
state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules. Finally, the lesson-
drawing  model  points  out  that  a  state  adopts  EU  rule,  if  it  expects  these  rules  to  solve 
domestic policy problems efficiently.  
In  the  last  decade,  several  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  have  tried  to 
simplify their tax systems, which may have contributed to an increase in tax compliance and 
reduction of the tax compliance costs (Hayoz & Hug, 2007). As Casanegra de Jantscher et al. 
(1992) pointed out several years ago: “A major challenge for countries in transition will be to 
develop tax systems that facilitate, rather than complicate compliance” (p. 140). Looking at 
data from the 1990s, Torgler (2003, 2007b) reports empirical evidence that tax morale was   5 
lower in Former Soviet Union (FSU) economies compared to CEE economies. It seems that 
CEE countries have been more successful than FSU countries at designing tax systems, tax 
administrations, and government structures in which taxpayers can put their trust. The tax 
administration  in  transition  countries  were  struggling  due  to  legal,  institutional,  and 
managerial  weaknesses  (Trasberg,  2005).  Such  institutional  improvements  and  observable 
changes may help to explain the higher willingness to cooperate in CEE countries, some of 
which exhibit even higher values of tax morale than certain Western European countries in 
1999 (Frey & Torgler, 2007). However, the sustainability of such changes is unclear, as is the 
extent to which the European Union has contributed to these tax morale changes. Transition 
countries required a new tax system and institutions quite quickly and there was limited time 
and  limited  possibility  for  gradual  improvement  or  experimentation  with  existing  tax 
arrangements: “Building up a new and efficient tax administration system is not an easy task 
in  the  situation  of  a  fast  collapse  of  half  a  century‟s  existing  economic  and  social 
organization.  (…)  Nevertheless,  while  the  New  EU  Member  countries  have  developed 
modern  tax  policy  and  legislation,  the  institutional  changes  in  tax  administration  delayed 
policy” (Trasberg 2005, p. 105). Mitra & Stern (2003) also stress: “The fundamental change 
which tax policy has undergone in transition as a result of changing bases and instruments has 
required the development of a tax administration capable of implementing those policies in 
countries where there was no such institution. While many countries now have modern tax 
legislation on their books, the development of the tax administration has lagged that of policy. 
This is due, not only to a greater focus on changes in policy rather than administration in the 
early years of transition, but also to the fact that demands on administration arising from 
changes in tax policy would usually precede development of supporting institutions” (p. 37). 
Exploring only the countries that have joined the European Union shows that 7 out of 
10 countries experienced a decay of tax morale between 2000 and 2008. Haughton (2007) 
argued that “the EU‟s power was limited to particular points in the accession process and   6 
varied significantly across policy areas” (p. 235). The EU was strongest during the decision 
phase,  while  deliberating  over  whether  or  not  to  open  accession  negotiations  (“powerful 
weapon in the EU‟s armoury” (p. 237). For example, at the Luxembourg European Council in 
1997, the five countries Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic were 
invited to begin accession negotiations. On the other hand, the five others in our investigation, 
namely  Bulgaria,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Romania  and  Slovakia  were  seen  to  have  made 
insufficient progress and were therefore excluded. In the Copenhagen European Council in 
December 2002 Bulgaria and Romania were not considered to be part of the “big bang” 
enlargement and in November 2002, the Commission put forward roadmaps for Bulgaria and 
Romania (Noutcheva & Bechev, 2008). However, even during the decision phase, the EU‟s 
power  was  limited  to  some  extent:  “The  decision  to  open  accession  negotiations  with 
Romania and Bulgaria appears to have been driven as much by broader geo-strategic concerns 
as by the countries‟ progression meeting the criteria. (…) Both Romania and Bulgaria were 
rewarded for their stance in the Kosovo conflict” (Haughton 2007, p. 238). The weak state 
capacity and governance set these two countries apart from other countries of the EU fifth 
Enlargement.  Furthermore,  very  few  reforms  were  carried  out  in  the  first  years  of  their 
membership  in  order  to  transform  the  political  and  administrative  system  to  meet  the 
membership requirements (Andreev, 2009).  Noutcheva  & Bechev (2008) stress: “On the 
whole,  Bulgaria  and  Romania  accelerated  reform  when  they  felt  the  “stick”  of  EU 
conditionality.  Every  time  the  EU  penalized  the  two  laggards,  their  governments  would 
rapidly respond by presenting revised reform strategies and making pledges for additional 
measures” (p. 124).  
Haughton (2007) also refers to the time-consuming tasks of integrating the EU law 
into domestic laws. This has led to fast-tracking procedures that bypassed the sustainable 
procedures of democratic deliberation. In addition, the administration reforms in CEE during 
the accession phase were on average not very fast and often done reluctantly. There were gaps   7 
between declared and implemented policies: “Indeed, in off-the-record remarks Commission 
officials lamented the difficulty of maintaining pressure on accession states to continue with 
reforms in many policy areas, especially when almost all the negotiating chapters had been 
closed”  (Haughton  2007, p. 240).  Focusing  on  four countries  (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia), Falkner & Treib (2008) also note that there are considerable general 
obstacles to practical application and enforcement of EU law. One observes a “combination of 
political contestation at the transposition stage, and quite systematic non-compliance at the 
enforcement and application stage” (p. 308).  
 
II.  EASTERN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES 
 
Fiscal concerns might be a key element to understand tax compliance and it is also often 
argued  that  tax  evasion  is  prevalent  in  transition  countries  (see,  e.g.,  Alm  &  Martinez-
Vazquez, 2003; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2000). Alm & Martinez-Vazquez (2003) point 
out:  “In  developing  and  transition  countries  (DTCs)  in  particular,  tax  evasion  is  often 
widespread and, indeed, systematic. Thus, the problem of tax evasion tends to have far more 
serious consequences in DTCs than in developed economies” (p. 147).  Reform process in the 
transition countries caused disorientation and a heavy economic burden (Kasper  & Streit, 
1999 and Gërxhani, 2004). The rapid collapse of institutional structures produced a vacuum in 
many  countries  that  led  to  large  social  costs,  especially  in  terms  of  worsening  income 
inequality and poverty rates and bad institutional conditions based on uncertainty and high 
transaction costs. Campos & Coricelli (2002) argued that the results of the transition process 
were still mixed, 10 years after the collapse of the communist regimes. A massive fall in 
output had occurred, reducing the real GDP (1999) in 23 of 25 transition countries. In most 
cases the output fell more than 50 percent of the 1989 GDP level. Central Eastern European 
countries  started  the  course  of  transition  from  different  historical  backgrounds,  physical 
endowments and reform processes. Central Eastern European countries were able to quickly   8 
achieve  secure  property  rights,  because  the  transition  process  occurred  earlier  and  more 
rapidly. Thus, reforms progressed much faster in Central Eastern European countries than in 
Former Soviet Union countries. As mentioned, evidence from the 1990s indicates that tax 
morale was substantially higher in Central Eastern European countries than in Former Soviet 
Union  countries.  Gërxhani  (2004)  points  out  that  many  transition  countries  had  an 
institutional  crisis  after  the  collapse  of  communism  which  produced  a  gap  between  old 
institutional destruction and the establishment of new institutions.  
One of the most difficult processes is the transformation of social contracts. Stiglitz 
(1999) points out: “If “reformers” simply destroy the old norms and constraints in order to 
“clean the slate” without allowing for the time-consuming processes of reconstructing new 
norms, then the new legislated institutions may well not take hold” (p. 9). Historical examples 
indicate that states “can be strong with regards to specific capacities, for instance coercion and 
repression, without “producing” voluntary compliance, a phenomenon to be observed in many 
transition countries. (…) This also means that they are weak with regard to their political 
capacity to rely on voluntary compliance” (Hayoz & Hug, 2007; p. 9). Tax reforms were 
highly  dependent  on  the  government‟s  political  commitment  and  the  capability  to  make 
radical and fast changes (Trasberg, 2005).  
Rose-Ackerman  (2001)  reports  that  citizens  were  critical  regarding  the  transition 
process  and state institutions and officials  and that the “sense of stasis is highest  for the 
former parts of the Soviet Union” (p. 419). We could describe transition countries as being in 
a  similar  situation  to  many  developing  countries,  suffering  simultaneously  from  “over-
government” and “under-government” (Frey & Eichenberger, 1999; p. 89). There is a strong 
combination of interventionism and bureaucracy. On the other hand, property rights are not 
sufficiently secured and there is a high degree of uncertainty, thus reducing the incentive for 
investment. Powerful interest groups interfering this process, inducing further constraints on 
fiscal institutions and the tax administrations in particular. These institutions were created   9 
arbitrarily  rather  than  through  a  structured  political  process  which  produced  even  greater 
political interferences such as tax concessions (Profeta, 2005). Noutcheva & Bechev (2008) 
point out: “The weakness of state institutions and civil society created ample opportunities for 
state capture. Reforms enabled predatory elites, coming mostly but not exclusively from the 
communist nomenklatura, to seize directly or indirectly great chunks of state property” (p. 
129).  
For transition countries it was difficult to find the right equilibrium of state activity, as 
the collapse of communism represented the collapse of a vast state apparatus. Frequent use of 
the exit option in form of tax evasion or tax avoidance through entering the shadow economy 
negatively affected the state‟s tax collection. This reduced the government revenue available 
to provide public goods and to build trustworthy institutions. The rule of law in transition 
countries was not sufficiently robust so that authorities could successfully pursue tax evasion 
cases (Trasberg, 2005). This encouraged development of the shadow economy, as enterprises 
had increased incentive to evade taxes because they were able to simply pay more bribes to 
protect themselves (see Levin & Satarov, 2000).  
The  issue  of  low  tax  effort  in  developing  and  transition  countries  has  been  quite 
relevant (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2006, 2008). Over the last forty years, many of 
these  countries  found  it  difficult  to  achieve  a  sustainable  policy  balance  given  the  often 
conflicting  and  frequently  changing  forces  they  have  faced,  from  external  and  internal, 
economic and political sources. It is thus not surprising that their tax policies have changed 
considerably over this period-- though much less in either level or structure than might have 
been expected. Indeed, it may be that countries tend to achieve an equilibrium position with 
respect  to  the  size  and  nature  of  their  fiscal  systems  that  largely  reflects  the  balance  of 
political forces and institutions, and stay at this position until „shocked‟ to a new equilibrium 
(Bird, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2008).    10 
Experiences  in  Latin  America  may  help  to  clarify  that  aspect.  An  interesting 
illustrative example is that of Mexico (see Bird et al. 2006). For instance, Martinez-Vazquez 
(2001) notes that one of the most striking features of the various major tax changes from the 
past few decades has been how very little apparent effect they have had on Mexico‟s tax-GDP 
ratio, which has remained almost constant. Tax policy and tax administration reforms over the 
last two decades have given Mexico a tax structure that is in many ways comparable to that in 
many  developed  countries,  yet  this  system  has  continued  to  perform  poorly  in  raising 
adequate revenues. The management of tax policy seems to have been a crucial element in 
this  failure.  The  fundamentally  sound  structure  of  Mexico‟s  tax  system  and  its  revenue 
performance has been undermined by numerous ad hoc policy measures. Transition countries 
have experienced similar problems. The position of the state and its reputation was affected 
because  of  numerous  mistakes  in  tax  practices  since  the  beginning  of  the  transformation 
process: “The state‟s attitude in many instances can be described as blatantly irresponsible. 
This  usually  took  the  form  of  continuously  modified  tax  policy  concepts  (partially 
implemented). When observing the politicians‟ behaviour in the area of taxes, one could get 
the impression that they juggled with tax instruments without fully realizing that these “toys” 
could go off one day. This attitude is typical of almost all governments of post-communist 
countries where the applied fiscal tools fail to ensure financial stability but their reform is 
opposed by the society” (Owsiak, 2007, p. 202). This induced a higher level of tax awareness, 
reputation costs, and a higher sensibility towards unfair treatments: “All attempts to improve 
the tax system on the part of the state are treated with suspicion and highly criticized by the 
media” (p. 194).  As Tanzi (2005) points out, “one thing that these countries had to learn was 
how to collect taxes from taxpayers that would rather evade paying them” (p. xvi).  
Frey (2003a) stresses that it is important to have social capital in terms of mutual trust 
and  honesty  in  the  transition  deregulation  and  privatization  process.  Citizens  in  planned 
socialist economies were not aware of directly paying taxes (Kornai, 1990).  Indeed, during   11 
the Soviet era, “taxpayers” were “large in size and small in number”, and the state had many 
other levers of control besides taxes (Martinez-Vazquez & Wallace, 1999).  However, in a 
shift  from  a  centrally  controlled  to  a  market  economy,  the  fiscal  system  needed  to  be 
reformed.  These changes represented significant shocks to ordinary citizens. In particular, for 
the first time, individuals were faced with the direct payment of taxes, including being asked 
to file different tax returns.  The transition process brought up many policy questions, among 
others:  the  tax  system,  the  structure  of  tax  administration,  and  the  degree  of  political 
participation. Voluntary compliance and self-filing, two important pillars in a modern tax 
system,  were  completely  absent  just  after  the  planned  socialism  (Martinez-Vazquez  & 
McNab, 2000).  Following the early transition, tax evasion and avoidance reached very high 
levels, as the new tax administration was not prepared to enforce taxes in a market-based 
economy with large numbers of taxpayers. Tax administration was poorly equipped (e.g., 
inappropriate use of modern computers and office technology) and managed. Information was 
used  ineffectively,  the  collection  enforcement  was  weak  and  there  existed  substantial 
corruption practices (Trasberg, 2005). Further, the connection between the payment of taxes 
and the provision of public goods had been largely concealed under socialism, which might 
have reduced the identification with the state and thus the willingness to pay taxes.   
Profeta  (2005)  stresses:  “Radical    reform  means  that  not  only  do  the  new  fiscal 
institutions have to introduce new instruments of taxation, a transparent fiscal system, and a 
well-working tax administration, but also that they have to correct attitudes, incentives and 
relations” (p. 65). Easter (2007), e.g., reports the findings of a poll  conducted by the tax 
administration in the Tambov region in the early years of the transition, which indicated that 
only one-third of the respondents argued that paying taxes to the state would provide any 
benefit to themselves.  
In the transition process, revenue needs are an important issue. Gordon (1994) points 
out  that  in  the  reform  process,  governments  in  Eastern  Europe  are  confronted  with   12 
expenditure  needs  such  as  investment  demand,  infrastructure  improvements,  and  social 
insurances.  Martinez-Vazquez  &  McNab  (1997)  argued  that  it  is  not  surprising  to  see 
taxpayers‟ resistance movements in the reform process when they are taxed for the first time. 
The undeveloped tax administrations, mostly engaged in cash management, were not prepared 
to do their work in a modern income tax system. A key problem was the lack of skills and the 
tax administration‟s inexperience with market-oriented taxes, alongside the failure of salaries 
to attract quality personnel to the tax administration profession. Moreover, weaknesses in the 
application of tax practices have brought about substantial problems.  
Unstable  tax  policies  have  damaged  the  economic  and  social  system  in  transition 
countries.  Sloppy  tax  legislation  and  the  arbitrariness  of  rulings  on  behalf  of  the  tax 
administration (Owsiak 2007) have reduced the state‟s credibility. New procedures have only 
been implemented slowly (for an overview see Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 1997). Almost 
20  years  ago,  Casanegra  de  Jantscher,  Silvani  and  Vehorn  (1992)  pointed  out  that  tax 
collection  problems  arise  in  transition  countries  as,  e.g.,  taxpayers  were  required  to 
“physically  make  a  trip  to  either  a  tax  office,  a  post  office,  or  a  bank”  (p.  125).  This 
presupposes that these services are reliable. Furthermore, greater problems result from the fact 
that with an increasing amount of taxpayers it becomes much more difficult to detect tax 
evaders or avoiders. This requires that “new fiscal institutions have to strengthen enforcement 
and at the same time develop the taxpayer education and improve compliance. This means 
that taxpayers have to be informed about the need to pay taxes and to be assisted in paying 
them, through the simplification of procedures” (Profeta 2005, p. 65).  
Tanzi (2005, p. xv) describes the reforms in the new EU countries as “a remarkable 
journey that has required enormous and difficult reforms. There was no road map for these 
countries to follow, because it was a journey on uncharted territory. No group of countries 
had ever travelled this territory before. However, there was the advantage of knowing where 
to  go,  if  not  how  to  get  there.  The  destination  was  the  creation  of  tax  systems  and  tax   13 
administrations not too different from those of the EU countries. In theory, one could assume 
that all these countries had to do was to make copies of the tax laws of some EU country and 
make them their own. This, however, would be missing completely what tax reform is and 
how tax systems must be nested in the economy of a country. They must reflect the structural 
characteristics  of  a  country‟s  economy  if  they  are  to  be  successful.  (…)  Some  of  these 
changes are still taking place. Thus, in some ways, their tax systems have been adapting 
themselves to moving targets. It is to be expected that this process will continue for a few 
more  years  until  the    economies  of  these  countries  become  fully  market  oriented,  with 
characteristics, structures, and institutions similar to those of the other European countries” 
(p. xiv). This analysis complements the previous studies that have explored tax morale in the 
1990s (Torgler 2003, 2007b, Frey & Torgler 2007).  
 
III.  EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
We explore the newest European Values Study (EVS) 2008 in conjunction with the data from 
1999/2000. The EVS is a European-wide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. 
The survey collects data on the basic values and beliefs of people throughout Europe and is 
seen as the most comprehensive research project on human values in Europe. The EVS was 
first carried out from 1981 to 1983. The methodological approach is explained in detail in the 
EVS  (1999)  source  book,  which  provides  information  on  response  rates,  the  stages  of 
sampling procedures, the translation of the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures 
of coding consistency, reliability of data, and data checks. Country surveys are conducted by 
experienced  professional  survey  organizations.  Interviews  were  face-to-face  and  those 
interviewed were adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Clear guidelines are provided to 
guarantee  the  use  of  standardized  information  in  the  surveys  and  the  national 
representativeness  of  the  data.  To  avoid  framing  biases,  the  questions  were  asked  in  a   14 
prescribed order. The response rates in 1999, for example, vary from country to country with 
an  average  response  rate  of  around  60  percent.  Because  EVS  poses  an  identical  set  of 
questions  to  individuals  in  various  European  countries,  the  survey  provides  a  unique 
opportunity to empirically examine tax morale changes over time. EVS has been designed as 
a wide-ranging survey, thereby reducing the danger of framing effects when compared with 
many other surveys that focus entirely on a specific question. This avoids the possibility of 
respondents reporting what they believe are the answers required by the researchers (Torgler 
&  García-Valiñas,  2007).  We  will  focus  on  the  10  Eastern  European  countries  that  have 
acceded to the European Union in 2004 or 2007. The general question to assess the level of 
tax morale in a society is: 
 
Please  tell  me  for  each  of  the  following  statements  whether  you  think  it  can  always  be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: (...) Cheating on tax if you have the 
chance (% “never justified”  = code 1  on a ten-point scale where 1=never and 10=always). 
 
Table 1 presents mean tax morale values for all countries in 1999 and 2008, based on a 
scale from 0 to 3, were 3 is the highest tax morale (tax evasion is never justifiable) while 
value 0 integrates values 4 to 10. In general, extracting only a single question from the EVS 
also reduces problems of complexity inherent with the construction of an index, especially 
regarding the measurement procedure or a low correlation between the items. Even so, one 
should recognize that there are some good reasons to use a multi-item index instead of a 
single question to measure tax morale. Tax morale is likely to be a multi-dimensional concept, 
which may require a multi-item measurement tool, as in psychometric studies. In this context, 
a  single-item  measure  like  ours  has  some  disadvantages  compared  to  a  multi-item  index 
(Lewis, 1982; Jackson & Milliron, 1986).  For example, a single-item measure may have 
difficulty  in  capturing  adequately  the  interrelated  facets  of  tax  morale,  and  may  also  be 
adversely affected by random  errors  in  measurement. Further, a multi-item  index has the   15 
advantage that errors should tend to average out, therefore producing a more reliable measure. 
Compared to a single-item measure, a multi-item index likely provides better score reliability 
by  pooling  together  information  that  the  items  have  in  common;  a  multi-item  tool  also 
increases  validity  by  providing  a  more  representative  sample  of  information  about  the 
underlying concept, and it increases precision by decreasing score variability (for a study that 
uses multiple-items see Torgler, Schaffner, & Macintyre, 2010). 
It  is  first  instructive  to  examine  the  aggregate  tax  morale  scores  (mean  values). 
Evidence on the nature of these changes is presented in Table 1, which tests whether the 
different samples have the same distribution using the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) 
test. The results reveal whether there is a significant difference between 1999 and 2008.  In 
general we observe that tax morale has decreased in 7 out of 10 countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). In all these cases the decrease is 
statistically significant at the 1 or 5% level. In 1999 Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic 
had a tax morale value above 2. In 2008 the values are now below 2 but still substantially 
higher than in  Estonia,  Latvia, and  Lithuania.  Together with  these three  Baltic countries, 
Romania has also the lowest tax morale value. This is consistent with the tax morale values in 
the 1990s (Torgler, 2003, 2007b). Uslaner (2007, p. 36) stresses that it “may not make much 
sense to have much faith in the legal system where the courts and the police cannot – or will 
not – control corruption or where citizens cannot see that their contribution to the public 
wealth actually makes the public more wealthy. In this sense, Romania is not exceptional: 
There may be less reason for Romanians to have faith in their leaders, who have been unable 
to control corruption or to bring its citizens prosperity.” As of 2008, Hungary has the highest 
tax morale value, followed by Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic. For Hungary 
and Slovenia, we report a statistically significant increase in tax morale.  It seems that Baltic 
countries are struggling with the vertical relationship between citizens and the government: 
“The majority of the population in the three Baltic States expresses rather low trust in civil   16 
service. In other words, citizens notice when the activities of civil servants differ from the 
standards  set  by  the  legislation  and  codes  of  ethics.  Corruption,  unethical  conduct  and 
maladministration are the most common realities faced by citizens. The only way to increase 
public  trust  is  to  provide  more  information  on  anticorruption  achievements  and  to  seek 
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in delivering services to various societal groups” 
(Palidauskaite, Pevkur & Reinholde, 2010; p. 68).  
 
Table 1:  
 




EU Country  Tax Morale 
1999  Joined  Tax Morale 
2008 
 Prob > 
|z|  N 
Bulgaria   2.316  1-Jan-07  2.391  0.397  2441 
Czech Republic  2.209  1-May-04  1.923  0.000  3660 
Estonia  1.563  1-May-04  1.259  0.000  2468 
Hungary  2.252  1-May-04  2.536  0.000  2482 
Latvia  2.113  1-May-04  1.561  0.000  2474 
Lithuania  1.433  1-May-04  1.546  0.044  2370 
Poland  2.228  1-May-04  1.809  0.000  2548 
Romania   1.97  1-Jan-07  1.775  0.001  2514 
Slovakia  2.181  1-May-04  1.925  0.000  2780 
Slovenia  2.122  1-May-04  2.265  0.017  2359 
 
 
Hanousek and Palda (2008) explore tax evasion using survey data (2000, 2002, 2004, and 
2006) from the Czech Republic to measure its development for the years 1995 to 2006. Their 
results  indicate  that  the  number  and  percentage  of  evaders  increased  until  the  early 
millennium and started to decrease. The authors called the inverse-U shape “an evasional 
Kuznets curve” (p. 3) and suggested this could indicate that hysteresis “may not be a feature 
of evasion in a transition economy” (p. 3).  However, our results on the development of the 
Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia  between  1999  and  2008  actually  indicates  a  decay  of  tax   17 
morale, although we do not know whether tax morale was higher in between these two time 
periods.  
Poland experienced a constant increase in tax morale during the 1990s (see Torgler 
2007b), but now we observe a decrease between 1999 and 2008. Kasper and Streit (1999) 
point  out  that  Poland‟s  strategy  after  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall  was  a  continuous  and 
systematic  institutional  transformation  without  the  unnecessarily  rapid  approach  favoured 
amongst other nations. We find evidence of strong economic growth in the years 1994 to 
1997. Between 1989 and 1997 Poland had an average annual rate of GDP growth of 1.6, 
which was the highest among the transition countries.  Thus, it is not surprising that tax 
morale increased during the 1990s in Poland (Torgler 2007b). Kornai (2000) stresses that the 
main  explanations  for  the  success  of  development  in  Poland  were  the  successful  macro 
stabilization, the bottom-up growth of the private sector, and the inflow of foreign capital. 
Furthermore, Poland was the first transition country after Hungary to reform its income tax 
(Martinez-Vazquez  &  McNab,  2000).  However,  results  from  the  first  decade  of  the  21
st 
century provide a less positive picture. Haughton (2007, p. 243) has pointed out that states 
such as Poland “demonstrated a particular stubbornness, driven in part by the belief that the 
enlargement boat would not embark without them” (p. 243). Examining political symptoms 
such as populist electoral gains, political radicalization, factional behavior, misbehavior of 
political  elites,  and  weak  majorities  for  an  ideologically  consistent  electoral  coalition, 
Mungiu-Pippidi  (2007)  finds that Poland and Romania lead the  group  of seven  countries 
analyzed. These countries are followed by Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.  
The  stability  of  tax  morale  in  Bulgaria  could  be  puzzling,  especially  in  light  of 
political developments there, although one should note that economic progress of Bulgaria 
has been described as a success story (Andreev, 2009). Bulgaria In relative terms, Bulgaria is 
a positive example for a constant gradual increase in tax morale over the last 20 years (see 
Torgler, 2003, 2007b for the 1990s). Bogetić (1995) points out that the initial transformation   18 
conditions  in  Bulgaria  were  more  like  FSU  countries  than  CEE  countries.  Bulgaria 
experienced a steep decline in revenues in the first years after the collapse of traditional tax 
bases,  similar  to  that  in  countries  such  as  Albania,  Moldova,  Lithuania,  Armenia,  and 
Georgia.  However,  at  the  end  of  1994,  considerable  efforts  were  made  to  liberalize  the 
economy,  and  output  had  started  to  grow.  Yet  Bogetić  and  Hassan  (1997)  criticized  the 
income  tax  development  in  Bulgaria  in  the  early  1990s,  as  the  1993  amendments  have 
complicated the tax system and increased the marginal tax rates from 40 to 52 %. On the other 
hand, Martinez-Vazquez (1995) stressed that by 1994 Bulgaria, had already established good 
revenue assignment systems such as local own-source revenues. Tax morale had increased 
from 2.240 to 2.316 in the second half of 1990s. The small increase between 1999 and 2008 
to 2.391 shows a certain level of sustainability.  In recent years, the country has carried out 
several large scale reforms in the revenue administration. The Convergence Program (2009-
2012) report for Bulgaria
2 documents several valuable tax policy changes (see also Appendix 
Table A1). The country has developed an integrated information system that connects tax 
offices with customs and other authorities who deal with public claims. They have introduced 
an  electronic  submission  process  for  annual  businesses‟  reports.  Before  this  system  was 
implemented, companies had to submit a hardcopy of their tax reports to the tax authority as 
well as an electronic version (different format) to the National Statistical Office. A single 
merged electronic submission has reduced the tax compliance costs. Tax policy in recent 
years has been oriented towards increasing the tax performance and reducing the shadow 
economy. There has also been a trend towards transferring the tax burden to indirect taxes and 
there has been a gradual removal of a number of exemptions. In 2008, a flat rate for taxing the 
income of natural persons was introduced as a further step to simplify the tax system. A 
reduction of the tax burden has led to an increase in GDP. The customs border control was 
strengthened and the revenue administration has reinforced control and inspections to reduce 
                                                 
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/countries/index_en.htm.    19 
illegal imports and tax fraud. Tax collection efficiency has been improved. There has been an 
increase  of  on-the-spot  inspections,  more  frequent  and  detailed  audits  as  well  as  more 
stringent  rule  enforcements  and  prosecution.  The  National  Revenue  Agency  has  also 
improved the services provided to the taxpayers (individuals and companies).  
In line with other transition countries, Bulgaria also reports a trend towards higher 
financial  autonomy.  Tanzi  (2005)  points  out  that  the  uniform  move  towards  fiscal 
decentralization in transition countries is undoubtedly a political reaction against the powerful 
central governments of the past: “Once the communist regimes were replaced, the citizens of 
these  countries  were  anxious  to  have  more  „voice‟  and  more  control  over  decisions  that 
affected  their  lives”  (p.  xvii).  This  trend  in  Bulgaria  is  connected  to  the  ability  of 
municipalities to administrate local taxes and to exercise discretion when setting local taxes 
under the conditions, procedure and within the limits that are specified in the Local Taxes and 
Fees Act.  In a fully decentralized system, there is intensive everyday interaction between 
taxpayers and local politicians and bureaucrats. This closeness between taxpayers, the tax 
administration  and  the  local  government  may  induce  trust  and  thus  enhance  tax  morale. 
Politicians and members of the administration are better informed about the preferences of the 
local  population.  Decentralization  brings  the  government  closer  to  the  people.  Many 
economists point out the relevance of giving sub-national governments the taxing power (see, 
e.g.,  Bahl,  1999).  One  of  the  strengths  of  a  decentralized  system  is  greater  transparency 
regarding tax prices and the public services received. Taxes are comparable to prices in some 
sense,  especially  at  the  local  level  (Blankart,  2002).  The  mechanism  of  fiscally  induced 
migration  in  federal  states  provides  a  strong  incentive  to  provide  public  services  in 
accordance  with  taxpayers‟  preferences.  Moreover,  federalism  and  local  autonomy  is 
connected  to  innovation.  Federalism  serves  as  a  laboratory  for  policy  inventions  (Oates, 
1999). There is empirical evidence that a higher level of local autonomy is correlated with   20 
higher  tax  morale  and  a  lower  size  of  the  shadow  economy  (Torgler,  Schneider  & 
Schaltegger, 2009).  
Taking into account such results, it may make sense to take a closer look at how 
governance and institutional quality has changed over time. We therefore use the International 
Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  data  set  that  provides  yearly  values  that  are  measured  in  a 
consistent manner over time. The ICRG has a special emphasis on aspects affecting private 
foreign investment decisions.  The rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of 
risk: political, financial, and economic. We will focus on the political risk component (see 
Figures 1 and 2). The political risk rating provides a standard basis from which to compare 
political  stability by using 12 different  measurements  that cover both  political  and social 





6, and law 
& order
7. A higher number of points indicates a lower potential risk and therefore higher 
scores represent a higher institutional and governance quality. We are going explore data 
between 1985 and 2011.  Figures 1 and 2 presents the results of our 10 countries. Figure 1 
shows a substantial improvement of governance and institutional quality in the 1990s until 
1998 for the countries Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. After that 
point we observe a decrease without substantial improvements in the first decade of the new 
century. A similar picture is found for the remaining countries in Figure 2, namely Estonia, 
Latvia,  Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. The  peak point for  Latvia and  Lithuania, after 
                                                 
3 Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy: “High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy 
has  the  strength  and  expertise  to  govern  without  drastic  changes  in  policy  or  interruptions  in  government 
services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure 
and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a 
strong bureaucracy receive low points”.  
4 Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower scores indicate "high gover nment officials are 
likely to demand special payments" and that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government"  in  the  form  of  "bribes  connected  with  import  and  export  licenses,  exchange  controls,  tax 
assessment, police protection, or loans. "  
5 Measures how responsive the government is with  its people.  
6 Assessment of the government‟s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. 
(subcomponents: government unity, legislative strength and popular support).    21 
substantial  improvements  beforehand,  is  in  2003.  For  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  Estonia  we 
observe a relatively significant decrease in political stability in the second half of the time 
period 2006-2011. Such results are somehow consistent with our tax morale results reported 
in Table 1. Accession to the European Union may have promoted reforms, but we do not 
observe a sustainable tax morale and political development. As mentioned in the introduction, 
it is challenging to explore the effect of the EU on these 10 countries‟ policies and governance 
due to causality problems. Possible alternative explanations that cannot be excluded (e.g., 
effects  of  globalization,  new  public  management,  new  information  and  communication 
technologies or a general European integration process). Figure 3  represents this issue in 
Eastern European countries that are not part of the European Union. In general we observe 
that governance quality is lower in these countries compared to our 10 Eastern European 
countries. Interestingly, the peak appears in the period 2003/2004 which is later than for the 
European members reported in Figure 1. However, such a development is consistent with 
observations  on  the  Baltic  countries  (see  Figure  2).  After  2008  we  witness  the  tendency 







Figure 1:  
Governance Quality of the First Group of Countries Between 1985 and 2011 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 The „law‟ sub-component measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the „order‟ sub-








































            Notes: Yearly averages from the ICRG data set. Average of the first two months for the year 2011.  
 
Figure 2:  






































Figure 3:  
















What are the driving forces that shape tax morale in these 10 countries? Trust in the 
government and the legal system could be key factors. Governments play a leading role in the 
transition process; institutional changes are the source of considerable uncertainty. Institutions 
reduce uncertainty by designing the structure for interaction, achieving greater certainty in the 
political  process.  Ensley  and  Munger  (2001)  argue  that  “if  rules  are  not  formalized,  the 
players  may  spend  too  much  time  arguing  over  the  rules  and  less  time  competing  in 
productive  activities”  (p.  116).  And  Kasper  and  Streit  (1999)  stress:  “Strong  institutional 
controls and accountability are required to control deeply rooted agent opportunism. The rule 
of  law  has  to  be  imposed  on  all  government  agents”  (p.  432).  Thus,  stable  and  easily 
navigable institutions help create reliability. Thus, institutional conditions or governance in 
general seems to be a driving force for such results. Success seems to depend on designing tax 
systems,  tax  administrations,  or  other  government  structures  and  institutions  (especially 
improved public service delivery) that would have helped to maintain tax morale. Violations 
of law and order and therefore a lack of “rule of law” does not help to achieve a sustainable 
institutional transformation process or improved tax morale. Corruption reduces citizens‟ trust   24 
in government authority. For example, Friedman, et al. (2000) show empirically that countries 
with more corruption have a higher proportion of activities in the unofficial economy. The 
private sector depends on effective legal regulation. Torgler and Schneider (2007, 2009) show 
that that improving governance and institutional quality and tax morale helps lessen a possible 
incentive to go underground. The results are quite robust when using more than 25 proxies of 
governance and institutional quality, testing for endogeneity and running a broad variety of 
specifications. Hanousek and Palda (2004) work with survey data from the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Hungary, and Poland, and find strong support for the hypothesis that there is a 
positive correlation between tax evasion and the perceived government services based on the 
taxes paid. A government based on a well-functioning democracy produces more trust than a 
dictatorship.  A lack of  public trust  undermines state revenues and thus  the  government‟s 
ability to perform its function. Trust in public officials might tend to increase taxpayers‟ 
positive attitudes and commitment to the tax system and tax-payment, which finally exerts a 
positive  influence  upon  tax  compliance.  Institutions  that  taxpayers  perceive  as  fair  and 
efficient might have a positive effect on tax morale, conditional on whether society views 
taxes as a price paid for government‟s positive actions. Thus, if taxpayers trust their public 
officials, they are more willing to be honest. If the government acts trustworthily, taxpayers 
might  be  more  willing  to  comply  with  the  taxes.  Similar  to  the  tax  administration,  the 
relationship  between  taxpayers  and  government  can  be  seen  as  a  relational  contract  or 
psychological  contract,  which  involves  strong  emotional  ties  and  loyalties.  Such  a 
psychological  tax  contract  can  be  maintained  by  positive  actions,  based  on  trust.  If  the 
government  tries  to  generate  trust  with  well-functioning  institutions,  co-operation  can  be 
initiated or increased. Furthermore, when taxpayers are satisfied with the way they are treated, 
the co-operation is enhanced. If the outcome received from the government is judged to be 
fair in relation to the taxes paid, no distress arises. The studies of 1990s show that trust in the 
state influences tax morale.    25 
Raiser, et al. (2001) analyzed transition countries and found that social capital in the 
form of civic participation and trust in public institutions has a significant impact on growth. 
Weakness of the legal system is a major problem in the transition process. Levin and Satorov 
(2000) stress that after the collapse of socialism, “judicial weakness left a legal vacuum that 
remains unfilled” (p. 120). Thus, as the transition process provides the opportunity to build 
new trustworthy institutions, increased attention should be given to developing credibility so 
that taxpayers feel comfortable with paying taxes. Our results indicate that tax administration 
and government are forced to drastically change their structures and their relationship with 
taxpayers.  
The post-accession trajectory of several Eastern European countries cannot be fully 
understood without focusing on the problem of corruption (Andreev, 2009). Citing a Financial 
Times report from 2008, Andreev (2009, p. 378) concludes that the fight against corruption 
“is the key to everything that is going on now in Romania”. Similarly, Noutcheva and Bechev 
(2008) argue that in Romania and Bulgaria corruption grew exponentially over time which led 
to the period 2000-2005 where Romania focused on the formation of institutions dealing with 
the prevention and prosecution of corruption. Bulgaria, on the other hand, concentrated on 
improving the legislation. However, Noutcheva and Bechev (2008) point out: All this does 
not necessarily mean that the EU can claim success. It is doubtful whether the EU-driven 
measures have been effective, especially in the short term. Even in Bulgaria where public 
perceptions of the presence of administrative corruption improved, the record is mixed (p. 
138).  
Corrupt bureaucracy will not award the services to the most efficient producers, but 
rather to the producer who offers the largest bribes. Thus, corruption reduces the efficiency of 
allocation and produces delays in transactions when additional payments are sought (see, e.g., 
Rose-Ackerman,  1997;  Jain,  2001).  In  many  former  centrally  planned  economies,  the 
government  and  the  administration  still  maintain  strong  discretionary  power  over  the   26 
allocation of resources, implicitly enhancing corruption. Tanzi (2002, p. 28) mentions several 
situations in which corruption is likely to be a problem for the tax administration:  
“-the laws are difficult to understand and can be interpreted differently so that taxpayers need 
assistance in complying with them; 
-the payment of taxes requires frequent contacts between taxpayers and tax administrators; 
-the wages of the tax administrators are low; 
-acts of corruption on the part of the tax administrators are ignored, not easily discovered, or 
when discovered penalized only mildly; 
-the administrative procedures (e.g., the criteria for the selection of taxpayers for audits) lack 
transparency and are not closely monitored within the tax or customs administrations; 
-tax  administrators  have  discretion  over  important  decisions,  such  as  those  related  to  the 
provision of tax incentives, determination of tax liabilities, selection of audits, litigations, and 
so on” 
 
Torgler  (2007b)  reports  a  strong  negative  correlation  between  corruption  and  tax 
morale  focusing  on  transition  countries  (r=-0.610).  This  result  is  consistent  with  Uslaner 
(2007) in showing that high levels of perceived corruption are associated with high levels of 
tax  evasion.  In  countries  where  corruption  is  systemic  and  the  government  budget  lacks 
transparency it cannot be assumed that the obligation of paying taxes is an accepted social 
norm.  Corruption  generally  undermines  the  tax  morale  of  the  citizens,  causing  them  to 
become frustrated. Taxpayers will feel cheated if they believe that corruption is widespread 
and their tax burden is not spent well.  
Based on the previous results obtained in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 it may make 
sense to use a multivariate analysis and to look at the factors that shape tax morale in 2008 in 
these 10 countries. We are particularly interested in whether perceived government quality, 
trust in the government or the legal system influence in tax morale.  
Trust  in  the  legal  system  has  been  measured  as  follows  (trust  in  justice  system): 
“Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the justice system: is it a great deal of   27 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” (4= a great 
deal to 1=none at all).  
The effects of trust on tax morale can be analyzed on two different levels: i) at the 
constitutional level and ii) at the current politico-economic level. With this question we focus 
mostly on the constitutional level, which is how the relationship between the state and its 
citizens is established. On the other hand, trust in government which is more influenced by 
the current politico-economic level has been developed based on the following question (trust 
in government): “Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government: is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” 
(4= a great deal to 1=none at all.) 
Furthermore, in some estimation we are also going to analyze the satisfaction with 
system for governing (governance quality): “People have different views about the system for 
governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very 
bad; 10 means very good”. In addition, we are going to check whether trust in the European 
Union  influences  tax  morale  (trust  in  European  Union):  “Could  you  tell  me  how  much 
confidence you have in the European Union: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” (4= a great deal to 1=none at all.) 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results. We have used a weighted ordered probit estimation 
to correct the samples and thus to get a reflection of the national distribution. The ordered 
probit  models  are  relevant  in  such  an  analysis  insofar  as  they  help  analyze  the  ranking 
information of the scaled dependent variable tax morale. However, as in the ordered probit 
estimation, the equation has a nonlinear form, only the sign of the coefficient can be directly 
interpreted and not its size. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find the 
quantitative effect of a variable on tax morale. In Tables 2 and 3 we present only the marginal 
effect for the highest value “tax evasion is never justified”.    28 
In  the  first  specification  we  only  report  country  dummies  using  Hungary  as  the 
reference group. We can see that all other countries have significantly lower tax morale than 
Hungary. In the second specification we add control variables, such as age, gender (female 
dummy), education
8, political interest (discuss politics
9 and follow politics
10), marital status 
(married), risk preferences (risk averse
11  dummy), religiosity  (church  attendance
12), and 
employment status (employed/self-employed dummy).  Most of these factors are commonly 
used in the tax morale literature (see Torgler, 2007a). Regarding the control variables, older 
people and women exhibit higher tax morale. Education and following news affect tax morale 
positively; but political interest measured through the intensity of discussing political matters 
with friends affects tax morale negatively. Controlling for general interest with the variable 
follow politics, discussion among friends may be more frequently observable if  individuals 
are dissatisfied which may explain the negative coefficient. Married persons have the highest 
tax morale. On the other hand, employed/self-employed persons have lower tax morale, while 
church attendance is correlated with higher tax morale which is consistent with the tax morale 
literature (Torgler, 2007c). In sum, the results indicate the relevance of including a broad set  
of control variables.  
Next we include the first two trust variables, namely trust in government and trust in 
justice system. In  Table  4  we  then  explore  trust  in  the  European  Union  and  governance 
quality.  All  four  factors  are  statistically  significant  with  a  positive  sign;  however,  the 
coefficient for trust in European Union is only statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
                                                 
8 At what age did you complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education? 
Please exclude apprenticeships. 
9 Question: When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, 
occasionally or never? (3=frequently, 2=occasionally, 1=never).  
10 How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers? 
(5 – every day, 4 – several times a week,  3 – once or twice a week, 2 – less often, 1 – never) 
11 Here are some aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones 
you personally think are important in a job? 18 items, one was:  Good job security (1=mentioned, 0=not 
mentioned).  
12 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days? (7 – more than once week, 6 – once a week, 5 – once a month, 4 – only on specific holy days, 3 – once a 
year, 2 – less often, 1 – never, practically never.   29 
quantitative effects are quite similar (around 1.5 percentage points for a unit increase in a 
four-point scale (three trust variables) and 0.7 percentage points for unit increase in the ten-
point  scale  variable  governance  quality).  These  results  demonstrate  the  relevance  of 
institutions  that  enhance  governance  quality.  Such  institutions  have  beneficial  effects  on 
social capital and the political outcome in these Eastern European countries.    30 
Table 2: Determinants of Tax Morale in 10 Eastern European Countries  
Order probit  Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal 
effect 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Independent variables   
Demographic factors                         
AGE        0.010***  13.61  0.004  0.010***  13.30  0.004  0.01***  13.18  0.004 
FEMALE        0.192***  8.54  0.076  0.191***  8.35  0.076  0.184***  8.01  0.073 
                         
EDUCATION        0.007***  2.75  0.003  0.006***  2.38  0.002  0.007***  2.66  0.003 
                         
Political concern/interest                         
DISCUSS POLITICS        -0.087***  -4.42  -0.035  -0.087***  -4.32  -0.034  -0.078***  -3.87  -0.031 
FOLLOW POLITICS        0.080***  8.22  0.032  0.082***  8.24  0.033  0.082***  8.22  0.033 
                         
Maritial status                         
MARRIED        0.076***  3.35  0.030  0.079***  3.40  0.031  0.073***  3.13  0.029 
                         
Risk preference                         
RISK AVERSE        0.043*  1.70  0.017  0.039  1.51  0.015  0.04  1.56  0.016 
                         
Religiosity                         
CHURCH ATTENDANCE        0.050***  7.51  0.020  0.050***  7.40  0.020  0.047***  6.91  0.019 
                         
Employment status                         
EMPLOYED/ 
SELF-EMPLOYED 
      -0.069***  -2.87  -0.027  -0.076***  -3.10  -0.030  -0.065***  -2.64  -0.026 
                         
Trust                         
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT              0.034***  2.35  0.014       
TRUST IN JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
                  0.045***  3.19  0.018 
                         
Country                         
HUNGARY  Ref. group      Ref. group      Ref. group      Ref. group     
BULGARIA  -0.289***  -6.01  -0.115  -0.346***  -6.72  -0.137  -0.331***  -6.34  -0.131  -0.324***  -6.12  -0.129 
CZECH REPUBLIC  -0.758***  -17.03  -0.289  -0.720***  -14.86  -0.276  -0.716***  -14.56  -0.275  -0.727***  -14.88  -0.279 
LATVIA  -1.084***  -22.81  -0.390  -1.133***  -22.52  -0.406  -1.122***  -21.99  -0.403  -1.154***  -22.50  -0.411 
LITHUANIA  -1.079***  -22.91  -0.388  -1.221***  -24.38  -0.428  -1.211***  -23.58  -0.425  -1.213***  -23.65  -0.425 
POLAND  -0.815***  -17.53  -0.307  -0.988***  -18.84  -0.363  -0.975***  -18.37  -0.359  -0.977***  -18.44  -0.359 
ROMANIA  -0.887***  -17.77  -0.330  -0.992***  -18.05  -0.364  -0.993***  -17.86  -0.365  -0.983***  -17.66  -0.361 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  -0.778***  -15.51  -0.295  -0.888***  -16.56  -0.333  -0.920***  -16.63  -0.343  -0.895***  -16.42  -0.335 
SLOVENIA  -0.416***  -8.71  -0.164  -0.452***  -9.07  -0.178  -0.463***  -9.04  -0.182  -0.464***  -9.21  -0.183 
                         
Number of observations  14,832      13,315      12,855      12,734     
Pro>chi2  0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000     
Pseudo R2  0.031      0.057      0.057      0.056     
Notes: Coefficients in bold, z-statistics in parentheses, and marginal effects in italics. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. As can been seen, HUNGARY is 
the reference group for the countries.We report the marginal effects of the highest tax morale score (3). 
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Table 3: Determinants of Tax Morale in 10 Eastern European Countries 
Order probit  Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal effect  Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal effect  Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal effect 
  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Independent variables   
Demographic factors                   
AGE  0.009***  12.64  0.004  0.010***  13.66  0.004  0.010***  12.26  0.004 
FEMALE  0.188***  8.05  0.074  0.185***  8.09  0.073  0.176***  7.35  0.070 
                   
EDUCATION  0.006**  2.20  0.002  0.006***  2.48  0.002  0.006**  2.17  0.002 
                   
Political concern/interest                   
DISCUSS POLITICS  -0.087***  -4.23  -0.034  -0.090***  -4.50  -0.036  -0.085***  -4.03  -0.034 
FOLLOW POLITICS  0.083***  8.15  0.033  0.082***  8.17  0.032  0.085***  8.03  0.034 
                   
Maitial status                   
MARRIED  0.081***  3.42  0.032  0.074***  3.19  0.029  0.074***  3.05  0.029 
                   
Risk preference                   
RISK AVERSE  0.036  1.39  0.014  0.048*  1.90  0.019  0.040  1.49  0.016 
                   
Religiosity                   
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.050***  7.17  0.02  0.048***  7.08  0.019  0.048***  6.69  0.019 
                   
Employment status                   
EMPLOYED/ 
SELF-EMPLOYED  -0.079***  -3.18  -0.031  -0.068***  -2.79  -0.027  -0.075***  -2.92  -0.030 
                   
Trust and Perceived  Government Quality                   
TRUST IN JUSTICE SYSTEM              0.028*  1.76  0.011 
TRUST IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  0.029*  1.95  0.012        0.015  0.88  0.006 
                   
GOVERNANCE QUALITY        0.017***  2.99  0.007  0.015**  2.31  0.006 
                   
Country                   
HUNGARY  Ref. group      Ref. group      Ref. group     
BULGARIA  -0.357***  -6.72  -0.141  -0.345***  -6.62  -0.137  -0.333***  -6.06  -0.132 
CZECH REPUBLIC  -0.717***  -14.47  -0.275  -0.747***  -15.01  -0.286  -0.738***  -14.47  -0.282 
LATVIA  -1.126***  -21.82  -0.403  -1.152***  -22.34  -0.411  -1.168***  -21.86  -0.414 
LITHUANIA  -1.235***  -23.55  -0.429  -1.221***  -23.92  -0.428  -1.248***  -23.01  -0.430 
POLAND  -0.953***  -17.76  -0.352  -0.994***  -18.59  -0.365  -0.962***  -17.49  -0.354 
ROMANIA  -0.996***  -17.69  -0.365  -1.034***  -18.22  -0.376  -1.014***  -17.36  -0.369 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  -0.922***  -16.55  -0.343  -0.920***  -16.37  -0.343  -0.951***  -16.11  -0.351 
SLOVENIA  -0.451***  -8.84  -0.178  -0.473***  -9.30  -0.186  -0.468***  -8.99  -0.184 
                   
Number of observations  12,299      12,808      11,605     
Pro>chi2  0.000      0.000      0.000     
Pseudo R2  0.056      0.057      0.058     
Notes: Coefficients in bold, z-statistics in parentheses, and marginal effects in italics. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. As can been seen, HUNGARY is 
the reference group for the countries.We report the marginal effects of the highest tax morale score (3).   32 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Campos and Coricelli (2002) report that during the first years of the transition process output 
fell,  labor  moved  away  and  the  physical  capital  stock  shrank.  The  rapid  collapse  of 
institutional structures produced a vacuum in many countries, followed by large social costs, 
especially  in  terms  of  worsening  income  inequality  and  poverty  rates.  In  shifting  from  a 
centrally controlled to a market economy, the fiscal system had to be reformed (e.g., income 
taxation). As the population was largely unaware of taxes or had no perception of the tax 
burden during planned socialism, it follows that reforms might have repercussions on tax 
morale and tax compliance. Several authors had pointed out that the EU worked as a magnet 
and a catalyst for rapid tax and institutional reforms for Eastern European member countries. 
The European Union “is  widely credited with having brought about an alignment of the ten 
post-communist countries‟ systems of governance economies and legal structures with the 
West European member states and the EU‟s acquis communautaire” (Epstein and Sedelmeier 
2008, p. 796). However, Mungiu-Pippidi (2007) stresses: “At the end of day, we seem to see 
confirmed once again the liberal principle that incentives, as opposed to planning, can deliver 
the goods. The incentive of EU accession led countries to the remarkable scores that they 
achieved in the early 1990s, when great progress was made in just a few years. The EU‟s 
coaching  and  assistance  (through  the  Commission  and  twinning  programs  with  member 
countries during negotiations) did not deliver much. Enlargement is nearly miraculous as an 
incentive, but quite sluggish and ineffective as an assistance process” (p. 15).  
The conditionality hypothesis suggest that after the accession, the membership reward 
is no longer conditional for the EU‟s new member states which leads  to behavioral and 
attitudinal changes: “As the incentive structure for the new members changes, post-accession 
compliance  with  costly  pre-accession  demands  of  international  institutions  should  
deteriorate. After all, if it had only been the external incentive of membership that drove   33 
compliance, then – having won the ultimate reward – why would the newest EU members not 
be tempted to roll back reforms that had been the most costly to implement?” (Epstein and 
Sedelmeier, 2008; p. 797). Similarly, Mungiu-Pippidi (2007) points out: “As for the day after 
accession, when conditionality has faded, the influence of the EU vanishes like a short-term 
anesthetic. The political  problems  in  these countries,  especially the political  elite‟s  hectic 
behavior and the voters‟ distrust of parties, are completely unrelated to EU accession. They 
were there to start with, though they were hidden or pushed aside because of the collective 
concentration  on  reaching  the  accession  target.  Political  parties  needed  to  behave  during 
accession  in  order  to  reach  this  highly  popular  objective,  but  once  freed  from  these 
constraints, they returned to their usual ways” (p. 16). Our results agree with this hypothesis, 
and indicate that the level of tax morale has not been sustainable. In 7 out of the10 Eastern 
European countries that joined the EU in 2004 or 2007 there was significant decrease in tax 
morale between 1999 and 2008. Győrffy (2009) discusses the persistent lack of government‟s 
trustworthiness: “Unrealistic expectations of the new system can similarly contribute to the 
general disillusionment. Transformation was originally perceived as a way to close the gap in 
living standards with the advanced West. As this did not materialize, disappointment was 
coded into the system. In spite of the considerable increase in living standards as measured  
by the availability  of various consumer goods (…), nostalgia for the previous regime has 
remained widespread” (p. 154).  
There  is  still  a  need  to  improve  not  only  governmental  quality,  but  also  tax 
administrations,  or  government  structures  in  which  taxpayers  place  their  trust.  Poorer 
governance outcomes can facilitate corruption. Low government legitimacy leads to higher 
incentives to try to avoid taxes (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). Our empirical findings indicate that 
increasing individuals‟ trust in the government, the justice system and the governance quality 
has  a  significant  positive  influence  on  tax  morale.  Thus,  for  these  10  European  Union 
members, further opportunities to build new trustworthy institutions should be evaluated and   34 
attention should be given to developing credibility so that taxpayers feel comfortable with 
paying taxes.  Our results  indicate that tax administrations  and governments  are forced to 
drastically  change  their  structures  and  their  relationship  with  taxpayers.  It  seems  that 
transition countries have to work on that goal, as new institutional conditions are not created 
in a few years. The rapid increase in governance quality before joining the European Union is 
followed by governance quality stagnation. The local role of the state is a key determinant in 
the  development  of  tax  morale.  Thus,  more  reforms  are  needed  concerning  the  political 
institutions and the quality of the tax administration. More direct democratic participation 
might be a key instrument for increasing tax morale. It raises trust and honesty, improves 
social outcomes (Frey, 2002) and reduces corruption (Levin & Satarov, 2000). Institutional 
arrangements which increase tax morale are necessary to stabilize individuals‟ tax compliance 
behavior. If the taxpayers are not actively integrated in the political process, tax morale might 
decrease. A decrease of tax morale can initiate a negative spiral. The more a taxpayer believes 
that others have low tax morale, the lower his/her moral costs will be to behave dishonestly 
(Frey  &  Torgler,  2007).  Thus,  tax  morale  erodes.  In  sum,  the  analysis  of  tax  morale 
development over time indicates that the EU enlargement cannot be seen as the ticket to 
sustainable tax morale. Local activities at the country level exert a significant influence over 
tax morale, and therefore one hopes that in the future efficient rules of the game also emerge 
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Table A1: Tax Policies in Bulgaria 
The National Revenue Agency has improved the services provided to the citizens and  companies, 
strengthened the control and the compulsory collection mechanisms as a tool for protecting revenues 
from violations and fraud by: 
 
  - improving the maintenance, integration and unification of the electronic services provided to 
  the National Revenue Agency clients, as well as developing new electronic services; 
 
  -developing new and improving the existing methodologies for revisions and inspections in 
  specific areas (by types of taxes, branches, groups of liable persons) and enhancing the quality 
  of the selection made (through an automated annual risk assessment of all liable persons); 
 
  -using the information from the VAT information exchange system and other information 
  received through the administrative co-operation with EU Member States for making 
  selections in the course of exercising tax control in connection with intra-community supplies 
  and acquisitions; 
 
  -introducing electronic revisions and strengthening the role of current control; 
 
  -improving the interaction and co-ordination of activities between the revenue authorities in 
  the National Revenue Agency and the law enforcement authorities – the Interior Ministry and 
  the Prosecutors Office, for the purpose of speeding up the trials against the perpetrators of tax 
  and social security fraud. 
 
A restructuring of the National Revenue Agency was already launched. It consists of the 
following: 
 
  -In 5 of the currently existing territorial directorates the functions of control and 
  collection will be focused. These will be the new Regional Directorates Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, 
  Burgas and Veliko Turnovo. In addition a “Large Taxpayers and Insurers” Directorate with 
  national coverage will be elaborated. The remaining 23 current territorial directorates will 
  retain the functions of providing services to clients. 
 
  - Within the five large territorial directorates special units will be set up for the so called 
  “medium-size taxpayers and insurers” - companies which form a large share of the revenues in 
  the region. Part of the reform constitutes also the updating of the criteria for large taxpayers 
  and insurers. As a result the large and medium-size taxpayers in Bulgaria - about 6 500  
  companies, will provide about 70% of the revenue administered by the National Revenue 
  Agency. 
 
  - At the same time a total of 638 people (8%) of the staff at the tax authority will be laid off in 
  all territorial directorates of the National Revenue Agency, including 90 positions in the 
  Central Division in Sofia. 
 
The well targeted reforms will bring significant benefit to taxpayers, business and state: 
 
  -Increase in the collection rate as a result of the stronger control. Updating the criteria for 
  medium-size taxpayers and insurers and large taxpayers and insurers for the purpose of 
  increasing their share in the overall budget revenue. 
  -Increase in the efficiency of the tax and insurance control, since in the new regional   41 
  directorates the selection will cover the persons and entities in the whole region, which in turn 
  will lead to selecting only the cases of regional significance. 
 
  -Flexibility in the allocation of the resources available among the offices of one regional 
  directorate of the National Revenue Agency, and increase in the functional specialisation of 
  the expert staff both in the general and in the specialised administration. 
 
For the clients: 
 
  – faster recovery of VAT as a result of the optimised process of selection; 
 
  – the possibility for filling documents and getting services in all currently existing offices of 
  the National Revenue Agency is kept; 
 
  – services of higher quality for a larger number of large taxpayers and insurers and medium-
  size taxpayers and insurers; 
 
  – improved implementation of the uniform standards in the control activity, the provision of 
  services to clients and receivables collection. 
 
Notes: Document of the Convergence Program 2009-2012, pp. 56-57. 
 
   
 
 
 